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NASAs Plans for Development of a Standard
for Additively Manufactured Components
Richard Russell
The current version of NASA standards for manned spaceflight hardware do not contain sufficient detail 
for the certification of additively manufactured components. The development of additively manufactured 
standards is currently in work by several standards organizations. However, NASA cannot wait on these 
organizations to develop such standards. NASA and its program partners in manned spaceflight (Com-
mercial Crew, Space Launch System and the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle) are actively developing 
additively manufactured components for flight as early as 2019.
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NASAs Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) has taken
the lead and has authored a center-level standard to aid in the
development of standard practices for powder-based fusion
processes. The goal of this standard is to provide a consistent
framework for the development, production, and evaluation of
additively manufactured components for spaceflight applica-
tions. A draft of this document was released in July 2015, and a
wide-reaching peer review was conducted. This specification
was relealed in October 2017.
This standard contains requirements that address part
classification, metallurgical process control, material property
development, part process control, part inspection and accep-
tance, equipment process control, and vendor process control.
In addition to manned spaceflight, consideration also has to
be given to developing standard practices for other NASA
missions such as science missions and aeronautics. To do so,
consideration would have to be given to additively manufac-
tured technologies besides powder bed fusion.
This paper will present an outline on how this standard and
its principles are being used to tailor requirements for manned
spaceflight applications. Also discussed are the initial plans for
a NASA wide standard which could be tailored for all NASA
applications and appropriate additively manufactured technolo-
gies.
Currently, no NASA standard exists to adequately address
additive manufacturing (AM). The latest release of NASAs
standard for materials and processes (M&P) requirements for
manned spacecraft, NASA-STD-6016A (Ref 1), contains a
paragraph that includes some level of guidance, but lacks on
specific requirements. The single requirement specifies that a
manufacturing and qualification plan be submitted and
approved by the responsible NASA M&P organization.
NASA cannot wait for America Makes or other national
standard organizations to develop standards. NASA and its
program partners in manned spaceflight (i.e., the Commercial
Crew, Space Launch System, and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle
Programs) are actively developing additively manufactured
parts for flight as early as 2019.
To bridge this gap, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center
(MSFC) personnel authored a center-level standard [MSFC-
STD-3716 (Ref 2)] to establish standard practices for the laser
powder bed fusion (L-PBF) process. The MSFC standard has
been used as a basis for the L-PBF process implementation for
each of the manned spaceflight programs. The principles of
MSFC-STD-3716 are based on foundational requirements of
design, metallurgical process control, material property devel-
opment, equipment control, and personnel training. This
standard and its companion specification, MSFC-SPEC-3717
(Ref 3), provide a consistent framework for the development,
production, and evaluation of additively manufactured parts for
spaceflight applications.
Like all NASA standards, MSFC-STD-3716 is designed to
be tailored for specific applications. To allow requirements to
be tailored for a particular application, a classification system is
necessary. MSFC-STD-3716 uses the system of classification
shown in Fig. 1, which is based on three key decisions:
consequence of failure, structural demand, and AM risk. This
decision tree leads to eight distinct classifications.
To determine part classification, the first decision is the
selection of the consequence of failure. If the failure of a
component creates a catastrophic hazard, then it is assigned a
Class A designation. Other components are assigned the lower
classification of Class B.
The second decision gate is the evaluation of structural
demand using the assessment criteria listed in Table 1. If all
structural assessment requirements meet or exceed those listed
in Table 1, then the part is classified as having low structural
demand (Subclass 3 or 4). If any of the listed requirements are
exceeded, then the component is assigned a high structural
demand (Subclass 1 or 2).
The third and final step in part classification is based on the
risk scoring criteria given in Table 2. If the summed risk score
is greater than or equal to 5, then the part is assigned a high risk
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(Subclass 1 or 3). A score of 4 or lower generates a low-risk
assignment and a Subclass rating of 2 or 4.
MSFC-STD-3716 describes the process for a Materials
Property Suite (MPS). The MPS is a collection of material
properties developed for a specific AM alloy and the conditions
for use in the structural assessment of the part. Properties are
developed with appropriate statistical significance Metallic
Materials Properties Development Standardization (MMPDS)
equivalent (meets the intent). The MPS is developed and
maintained for each applicable AM alloy and condition. The
Fig. 1 MSFC-STD-3716 classification system
Table 1 Assessment criteria to determine structural demand
Material property Criteria for high structural margin
Loads environment Well-defined or bounded loads environment
Environmental degradation Temperature only
Ultimate strength 30% margin over factor of safety
Yield strength 20% margin over factor of safety
Point strain Local plastic strain < 0.005
High-cycle fatigue, improved surfaces 4 9 additional life factor or 20% below required fatigue limit cyclic stress range
High-cycle fatigue, as-built surfaces 10 9 additional life factor or 40% below required fatigue limit cyclic stress range
Low-cycle fatigue No predicted cyclic plastic strain
Fracture mechanics life 10 9 additional life factor
Creep strain No predicted creep strain
Table 2 Assessment criteria for additive manufacturing risk
Additive manufacturing risk Yes No Score
All critical surface and volumes can be reliably inspected, or the design permits adequate proof testing based on stress state? 0 5
As-built surface can be fully removed on all fatigue-critical surfaces? 0 3
Surfaces interfacing with sacrificial supports are fully accessible and improved? 0 3
Structural walls or protrusions are ‡ 1 mm in cross section? 0 2
Critical regions of the part do not require sacrificial supports? 0 2
Total
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development process is submitted to NASA via a Materials
Usage Agreement. The actual values are made available for
NASA review. The MPS is only applicable to parts submitted
to an appropriate qualified part process. The applicability of the
MPS to the part is ensured by thorough first article inspection
and continuous process monitoring of mechanical properties
through witness specimens.
MSFC-STD-3716 also describes the process for creation of
a qualified metallurgical process (QMP). The QMP is analo-
gous to a Weld Procedure Qualification Record. Each powder
bed fusion machine must have an alloy-specific QMP. The
QMP includes items such as powder feedstock controls and
recycle limits, a fusion process specification, microstructural
evaluation, and thermal processing. A QMP can be customized
when unique process control is required. The QMP includes
mechanical property evaluation, which establishes the perfor-
mance baseline. These data feed the Process Control Reference
Distribution, which provides a measure of statistical process
monitoring. The QMP is registered to the MPS, and the QMP
record is configuration controlled.
Witness specimens provide direct evidence of the systemic
health of the AM process during the witnessed build. Therefore,
MSFC-STD-3716 provides the requirement for witness sam-
pling, including samples types, designs, quantities, layout in the
build volume, test methods, and acceptance criteria. However,
witness specimens are only an indirect indicator of AM part
quality through inference. Types of AM build witness speci-
mens include metallurgical, tensile (strength and ductility), and
fatigue.
Another key element required by MSFC-STD-3716 is the
development and approval of a part production plan (PPP).
There are two purposes for the PPP. The first is to provide
details related to part process control that are unique to the AM
process that cannot be captured on the part drawing. The
second is to provide a configuration-controlled document that
conveys the full intent for the design, production, and use of the
component. A complete list of the elements that make up a PPP
is included in Appendix A of the standard.
Based on the principles of MSFC-STD-3716, the develop-
ment of agency-level standards is underway. A team with
representatives from nine NASA centers with consultants from
other government agencies has been formed. The goal of this
team is to develop standards that will apply to multiple AM
processes and be readily adaptable to all NASA centers,
programs, and projects. The standard will create requirements
with guidance that then can be used to develop manufacturing
plans and provide product specifications for both general and
specific applications. The standard will not specifically state
how to manufacture or certify a component, but the require-
ments will identify factors that need to be addressed for all
phases of design, manufacture, and qualification.
The NASA standards will be applicable to mature tech-
nologies. Specific technologies will be discussed in the
documents, but to allow for expansion, the documents will
not be limited to only these technologies. The standards will
concentrate specifically on metals (powder and wire fed) and
polymers. Materials determined to be out of scope include
ceramics, composites, regolith, and printed circuits.
The structure of the new standards will be based on the
outline of MSFC-STD-3716. The requirements summary listed
in Appendix F, Table VIII, will be utilized and modified as
appropriate. Sections of MSFC-STD-3717 will be utilized for
tailoring guidance and for the creation of specific process
specifications. An appendix will be written to document
tailoring guidelines. The use of industry standards will be
encouraged, but the standards will not specifically list or
endorse any such document.
For classification, a slightly different approach was devel-
oped, as shown in Fig. 2. The new classification system has
three levels of primary classification (A, B, and C) and allows
Fig. 2 Proposed classification system for new NASA standards
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Fig. 3 Mission classes (extracted from NPR 8705.4, Appendix B)
Fig. 4 Requirements matrix example
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for a secondary classification for certain cases for Class A and
B parts. The primary classification drives the tailoring of
requirements for each part, and the secondary classification acts
as a communication tool to allow for effective risk management
when necessary.
The first decision gate is the same as that given in MSFC-
STD-3716, but the criteria are modified to address all NASA
applications. Initially, a part is designated as Class A, ‘‘High
Consequence of Failure,’’ if one or more of the following
criteria are met:
• Fracture critical per NASA-STD-5019A (Ref 4).
• Failure would lead to a catastrophic hazard (i.e., loss of
life, disabling injury, or loss of a major national asset).
• Failure would lead to the loss of one or more primary/
minimum mission objectives.
Note that in the event of part redundancy, Class A may still be
applicable if the project decides that the risk of a common mode
failure is credible.
Unlike the MSFC standard, the new classification will allow
parts with a low consequence for failure that could fit into a ‘‘do
no harm’’ category to be designated as Class C. Parts that do
not meet this criterion will be assigned as Class B. The exact
determination of which attributes would allow for a Class C
designation is under development.
For NASA science missions and payloads, a risk-based
mission classification is assigned per NASA Procedural
Requirement (NPR) 8705.4 (Ref 5). Figure 3 shows a descrip-
tion of the mission classes. To capture all the missions that
would be covered by the NASA standards, a total of six
mission classes should be considered:
1. Manned spaceflight.
2. Class A (per NPR 8705.0004).
3. Class B (per NPR 8705.0004).
4. Class C (per NPR 8705.0004).
5. Class D (per NPR 8705.0004).
6. Associated ground support equipment and test hardware.
The NASA team considered three possible approaches to how
part classification and mission classification could interact.
These three cases are:
1. Part class determines requirement set independent of mis-
sion class.
2. Mission class influences part class through consequence
of failure or other criteria.
3. Part class and mission class requirements are combined
into a common risk matrix.
The team consensus and recommended approach was that the
part classification and the mission classification should be
considered independently. This decision led to the recommen-
dation to develop three separate NASA standards, one each for
crewed spaceflight, uncrewed spaceflight, and aeronautics.
For the development of each NASA standard, the require-
ments summary given in Appendix F, Table VIII, of MSFC-
STD-3716 will be used as the basis for tailoring. Table VIII
contains additive manufacturing requirements (AMRs). For
each NASA standard, a unique requirements matrix will be
developed that modifies each AMR to make it applicable for its
application. Figure 4 shows a sample requirements matrix. The
matrix will designate each requirement based on part classifi-
cation to be used as written, optional, or tailorable. Tailoring
guidelines will be provided.
The use of process specifications will be defined in the
requirements matrix. In cases where no industry standard exists
or the standard is considerably substandard,NASAmay decide to
author a unique specification. For areas covered by MSFC-
SPEC-3717, tailoring guidance will be provided either in the
body of the text or in an appendix. Guidance will be provided on
how to write a procurement specification. Certain procurement
specificationsmay bewritten tomake it as easy as possible to buy
a ‘‘good’’ part from a ‘‘proven’’ manufacturer. These may not be
appropriate for Class A1 parts on Class A missions. Industry
standards will be leveraged as much as possible. These procure-
ments will focus primarily on raw material requirements, vendor
quality/process controls, historical material property trends, and
limited part-specific requirements. When appropriate, procure-
ment specifications will be written intentionally in a non-specific
manner to allow vendors to control proprietary processes.
In addition to tailoring and procurement specification
guidelines, additional appendices may be required to cover
topics such as:
• Guidance in writing an AM control plan.
• Guidance in writing a PPP.
• Guidance on what should be in a process qualification or
feedstock specification.
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